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Indigenous cultural heritage plays an essential role in the building of the 
identity of indigenous peoples and thus its protection has profound 
significance for their dignity and the realization of their human rights. 
Although the recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights and cultural 
heritage has gained some momentum at the international law level since 
the adoption of the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP),1 law and policy tend to favour 
macroeconomic notions of growth regardless of actual or potential 
infringement of indigenous entitlements.2 Many of the estimated 370 
million indigenous peoples around the world have lost, or are under 
imminent threat of losing, their ancestral lands, because of the exploitation 
of natural resources.3  
While the clash between economic development and indigenous 
peoples’ rights is by no means new, this chapter approaches this well 
known theme from a new perspective by focusing on international 
economic law. This article questions whether local indigenous ways of 
life can prevail over international economic governance. The protection of 
indigenous heritage has intersected with international trade law 
determining interesting clashes between indigenous culture and free trade. 
In parallel, a potential tension exists when a state adopts cultural policies 
interfering with foreign investments as such policies may be deemed to 
                                                     
1 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, A/RES/61/295 
(2007). 
2 L Barrera-Hernández “Indigenous Peoples, Human Rights and Natural Resource 
Development: Chile’s Mapuche Peoples and the Right to Water” (2005) 11 
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law 1. 
3 N Pillay “Let us Ensure that Development for Some is not to the Detriment of 
the Human Rights of Others”, Statement by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=11284
&LangID=E (2011), accessed September 26th 2015. 
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amount to indirect expropriation or a violation of other investment treaty 
provisions. The key question of this study is whether international 
economic law has embraced a pure international economic culture or if, 
on the other hand, it is open to encapsulating cultural concerns in its 
modus operandi. 
Until recently, international economic law had developed only limited 
tools for the protection of cultural heritage through dispute settlement.4 
However, recent arbitral awards have shown a growing awareness of the 
need to protect indigenous cultural heritage within investment disputes. 
The incidence in the number of cases in which arbitrators have balanced 
the different values at stake is increasing.5 In parallel, at the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), the recent case concerning the seal products ban 
adopted by the E.U. has brought to the fore a veritable clash of cultures 
between moral concerns about animal welfare on the one hand, and 
indigenous heritage and free trade on the other. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, this chapter addresses the 
following issue:– since indigenous heritage is “local” by definition, should 
its governance be purely local or should it pertain to international law? 
The latter approach is to be preferred in the light of the UNDRIP and 
relevant international law instruments. The international norms protecting 
indigenous cultural heritage will be scrutinised and particular reference 
will be made to the UNDRIP. Second, the international economic 
governance shall be sketched out. Reference to the World Trade 
Organization and investment law regimes and their effective and 
sophisticated dispute settlement mechanisms will be made. Third, relevant 
case studies will be analysed and critically assessed. Fourth, this chapter 
offers some legal options to better reconcile the different interests at stake. 
Fifth, some conclusions shall be drawn. It is argued that the UNDRIP 
contributes significantly to current discourse on indigenous heritage. This 
does not mean that further steps should not be taken. On the contrary, the 
collision between the protection of economic interests and indigenous 
entitlements in international economic law makes the case for 
strengthening the current regime protecting indigenous heritage. In 
particular, the participation of indigenous peoples in the decisions which 
affect their rights and heritage is crucial. 
 
                                                     
4 See generally V Vadi “When Cultures Collide: Foreign Direct Investment, 
Natural Resources and Indigenous Heritage in International Investment Law” 




2. Global v Local: The International Protection of Indigenous 
Heritage 
 
As indigenous heritage is “local” by definition, should its governance be 
purely local or should it pertain to international law? Indigenous 
communities are geographically rooted in given loci, yet politically 
situated between the national and the international spheres. 
Geographically, indigenous peoples are “indigenous” “because their 
ancestral roots are embedded in the lands on which they live … much 
more deeply than the roots of more powerful sectors of society living on 
the same lands.”6 They are “culturally distinctive societies that find 
themselves engulfed by settler societies born of the forces of empire and 
conquest”.7 They have been living in a given territory for immemorial 
time even before the establishment of the nation state under whose 
sovereignty they live today.8 
Politically, indigenous peoples are situated between the national and 
the international arenas. For years, indigenous peoples have been 
considered to be mere components of states rather than “legal unit[s] of 
international law”.9 They were regulated under domestic law only.10 As 
                                                     
6 J Anaya International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples (Aspen 
Publishers, 2009). 
7 J Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 1996). 
8 Art. 1 of the ILO Convention 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries defines “indigenous peoples” “on account of their descent 
from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to 
which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonization or the 
establishment of present state boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal 
status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political 
institutions”.  
9 Cayuga Indians (Gr. Brit.) v. United States, 6 Review of International Arbitral 
Awards 173 (1926) 176 (stating that an Indian tribe “is not a legal unit of 
international law”). 
10 S Wiessner “Indigenous Self-Determination, Culture, and Land: A 
Reassessment in Light of the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples” in E Pulitano (ed) Indigenous Rights in the Age of the UN Declaration 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) pp 31-63 at 38. See also W 
Twining, General Jurisprudence: Understanding Law from a Global Perspective 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) p 362 (calling the assumption 
that domestic law consists of the state law and that public international law 
consists of the law of sovereign states as the “Westphalian duo”); R Dibadj, 
“Panglossian Transnationalism” (2008) 44 Stanford Journal of International Law 
253–299 at 256 (noting that as “a product of the Westphalian state-centered 
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Daes puts it, “[i]nternational law knew no other legal subjects than the 
state … and had no room for indigenous peoples.”11  
Historically, however, indigenous peoples have played a role in 
international relations, signed treaties and being recognised as nations. 
The issues of “[indigenous] rights and sovereignty are rooted in the first 
encounters between the [tribes] and the colonial powers of the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries.”12 “Weakened by years of warfare, disease, and 
increasingly scarce natural resources”, indigenous peoples likely assented 
to various treaties with colonial powers “to insulate themselves against 
further … encroachments and preserve what remained of their heritage 
and traditional way of life”.13 Due to the failures of these early treaties and 
national law to address indigenous peoples’ rights adequately, 
international law has increasingly regulated indigenous peoples’ matters 
in the past four decades, reaffirming their rights and various entitlements. 
The momentum for the resurgence of indigenous rights at the international 
level was given by the emergence of the human rights paradigm in the 
aftermath of WWII and the decolonization process. There has been a 
paradigm shift in international law; and indigenous peoples have been 
deemed as “legal subjects under international law”.14  
At the international level, indigenous peoples’ rights have been 
protected and promoted in two complementary ways: on the one hand, the 
protection and promotion of indigenous peoples’ rights remain embedded 
in the human rights framework. On the other hand, indigenous peoples 
have supported the creation of special forums and bodies which 
exclusively deal with their situation” as well as “the elaboration …of 
                                                                                                                        
system of world law”, international law “maintains that the states are the only 
subjects of international law…”) 
11 E-I Daes “Indigenous Peoples’ Rights to their Natural Resources” in A 
Constantinides and N Zaikos (eds) The Diversity of International Law 
(Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2009). 
12 AF Kinney “The Tribe, the Empire, and the Nation: Enforceability of Pre-
Revolutionary Treaties with Native American Tribes” 39 Case Western Reserve 
Journal of International Law (2007-2008) 898-99 (referring to the situation of 
indigenous tribes in Virginia). 
13 Ibid. at 902 (noting that these treaties “remained hardly more than empty 
words”, proving to be “little more than a cessation of open hostilities”.) 
14 For a seminal study, see RL Barsch, “Indigenous Peoples in the 1990s: From 
Object to Subject of International Law” (1994) 7 Harvard Human Rights Journal 
(1994) 33. See also J Gilbert, Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights under 




instruments which only focus on [their] rights”.15 For instance, the 
creation of the United Nations Permanent Forum for Indigenous Issues 
(UNPFII) reflects the efforts of indigenous peoples “to create space for 
themselves and their issues within the United Nations human rights 
machinery”.16 Analogously, both the 1989 International Labour 
Organization Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries (ILO Convention No. 169)17 and the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP)18 are 
special instruments for the protection of indigenous peoples.  
While a number of international law instruments protect different 
aspects of indigenous heritage,19 indigenous culture plays a central role in 
the UNDRIP. Drafted with the very active participation of indigenous 
representatives, the Declaration constitutes the summa of two decades of 
preparatory work.20 While this landmark instrument is currently not 
binding, this may change in the future to the extent that its provisions 
reflect customary international law.21 The Declaration constitutes a 
                                                     
15 K Göcke “Protection and Realization of Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights at the 
National and International Level” 5 Goettingen Journal of International Law 
(2013) 124. 
16 S Sargent “Transnational Networks and United Nations Human Rights 
Structural Change: The Future of Indigenous and Minority Rights” (2012) 16 
International Journal of Human Rights 123-151 at 136 (also noting that the 
membership composition of the UNPFII – of state and indigenous representatives 
on equal footing – “is a unique achievement in international indigenous rights, 
and indeed, in international law”. Ibid. at 139). 
17 International Labour Organization Convention Concerning Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO Convention No. 169), 27 June 
1989, 28 ILM 1382. 
18 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) 
G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (13 September 2007). The 
Declaration was approved by 143 nations, but was opposed by United States, 
Canada, New Zealand and Australia. However these four nations subsequently 
endorsed the Declaration. 
19 For an overview, see eg M Hadjioannou “The International Human Right to 
Culture: Reclamation of the Cultural Identities of Indigenous Peoples under 
International Law” (2005) 8 Chapman Law Review 201. 
20 Above n 11 at 31. 
21 On the legal status of the Declaration, see M Barelli, “The Role of Soft Law in 
the International Legal System: The Case of the United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” (2009) 58 ICLQ 957 (arguing that “regardless 
of its non-binding nature, the Declaration has the potential effectively to promote 
and protect the rights of the world’s indigenous peoples” and that “the relevance 
of a soft law instrument cannot be aprioristically dismissed”. Ibid. at 983). 
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significant achievement for indigenous peoples worldwide.22 Not only 
does it re-empower indigenous peoples, but it shifts discourse on their 
rights from the local to the international level with a cogency which was 
missing before. As Stavenhagen notes, “The Declaration provides an 
opportunity to link the global and local levels, in a process of 
glocalization”.23 
Indigenous culture is a key theme of the Declaration.24 Many articles 
are devoted to different aspects of indigenous culture; and the word 
“culture” appears no less than 30 times in its text.25 Not only does the 
UNDRIP recognise the dignity and diversity of indigenous peoples’ 
culture but it also acknowledges its essential contribution to the “diversity 
and richness of civilization and cultures which constitute the common 
heritage of mankind”.26 The Declaration recognises the right of 
indigenous peoples to practice their cultural traditions27 and maintain their 
distinctive spiritual and material relationship with the land which they 
have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used.28  
For indigenous peoples, land is the basis not only of economic 
livelihood, but also the source of spiritual and cultural identity.29 
Indigenous peoples maintain cultural and spiritual ties with the ancestral 
territory they have traditionally occupied,30 not only due to the presence of 
                                                     
22 E Pulitano “Indigenous Rights and International Law: An Introduction”, in E 
Pulitano (ed) Indigenous Rights in the Age of the UN Declaration (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012) 1-30 at 25.  
23 R Stavenhagen “Making the Declaration Work” in C Charters and R 
Stavenhagen (eds) Making the Declaration Work: The United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Copenhagen: IWGIA, 2009) p. 
357.  
24 See generally S Wiessner “The Cultural Rights of Indigenous Peoples: 
Achievements and Continuing Challenges” (2011) 22 European Journal of 
International Law 121 at 139.  
25 See Y Donders “The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. A 
Victory for Cultural Autonomy?” in I Boerefijn and J Goldschmidt (eds) 
Changing Perceptions of Sovereignty and Human Rights 
(Antwerp/Oxford/Portland: Intersentia, 2008) p. 99. 
26 UNDRIP, preamble. 
27 UNDRIP, Article 11. 
28 See eg UNDRIP, preamble, Articles 8, 11, 12.1 and 13.1. 
29 J Gilbert “Custodians of the Land- Indigenous Peoples, Human Rights and 
Cultural Integrity” in M Langfield, W Logan and M Craith (eds) Cultural 
Diversity, Heritage and Human Rights (Oxon: Routledge, 2010) pp 31-44 at p. 
31. 
30 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tigni Community v. Nicaragua, 
Judgment of 31 August 2001, IACtHR Series C, No. 79, 75, para. 149 (clarifying 
that “For indigenous communities, relations to the land are not merely a matter of 
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sacred sites but also because of the intrinsic sacred value of the territory 
itself.31 They “see the land and the sea, all of the sites they contain, and 
the knowledge and the laws associated with those sites, as a single entity 
that must be protected as a whole…”32 Because of this holistic approach 
of indigenous peoples, a UN study insists that “all elements of heritage 
should be managed and protected as a single, interrelated and integrated 
whole”.33 Moreover, other experts have stressed that “Indigenous culture, 
religion and spirituality are so connected with the land that deprivation of 
land is tantamount to deprivation of indigenous identity and culture”.34  
Among the different theoretical models that have been proposed to 
deal with indigenous peoples’ rights, the cultural integrity approach 
“emphasizes the value of traditional cultures in and of themselves as well 
as for the rest of society” focusing on cultural entitlements, which are 
firmly rooted in the human rights catalogue.35 In sum, the cultural 
integrity model focuses on cultural considerations to protect indigenous 
peoples’ identity, and acknowledges the dynamic nexus between 
indigenous peoples and their lands. More importantly, cultural integrity is 
essential to indigenous sovereignty. As a Native American scholar points 
out, indigenous sovereignty relies on a continued cultural integrity: “to the 
degree that a nation loses its sense of cultural identity, to that degree it 
suffers a loss of sovereignty”.36  
Some scholars criticise this approach, contending that an excessive 
emphasis on the cultural entitlements of indigenous peoples can reduce 
their political rights and limit their claims to self-determination.37 
                                                                                                                        
possession and production but a material and spiritual element which they must 
fully enjoy, even to preserve their cultural legacy and transmit it to future 
generations”.) 
31 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgment on 
Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 28 November 2007, (ser. 
C) No. 172, at para. 82. 
32 C O’Faircheallaigh ‘Negotiating Cultural Heritage? Aboriginal Mining 
Company Agreements in Australia” (2003) 39 Development and Change 25-51 at 
27. 
33 E-I Daes Study on the Protection of the Cultural and Intellectual Property of 
Indigenous Peoples, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub 2/1993/28. 
34 E Stamatopoulou, “Indigenous Peoples and the United Nations: Human Rights 
as a Developing Dynamic” 16 Human Rights Quarterly (1994) at 76. 
35 L Westra Environmental Justice and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(London: Earthscan, 2008) p. 10. 
36 V Deloria Jr. “Self-Determination and the Concept of Sovereignty” in JR 
Wunder (ed) Native American Sovereignty (New York: Garland, 1996) p 118. 
37 See generally C Cutler “The Globalization of International Law, Indigenous 
Identity, and the ‘New Constitutionalism’,” in W Coleman (ed) Property, 
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According to these authors, over-emphasizing culture risks undermining 
self-determination. Nonetheless, if one deems the cultural integrity 
approach as complementary to other approaches, such an approach is of 
fundamental importance to understanding and better protecting the culture 
and human rights of indigenous peoples.  
Instead, a real limitation of the legal framework protecting indigenous 
cultural heritage is the absence – aside from the classical human rights 
mechanisms – of a special international court or tribunal, where 
indigenous peoples can raise complaints regarding measures which affect 
them.38 In fact, while (national and regional) courts and (international) 
monitoring bodies have been extremely important in the process of 
articulation and implementation of indigenous rights,39 the lack of a 
dedicated world court allows indigenous heritage related cases to be 
attracted by international (economic) fora with limited if no mandate to 
adjudicate indigenous claims. The UNDRIP does not change this 
situation. Therefore, notwithstanding the major political merits of the 
Declaration, “UNDRIP does not definitively resolve, but at best 
temporarily mediates, multiple tensions.”40 
 
3. International Economic Governance and the Diaspora of 
indigenous Culture related Disputes before International Economic 
Fora. 
 
International economic law is a well-developed field of study within the 
broader international law framework and is characterised by well-
developed and sophisticated dispute settlement mechanisms. While the 
                                                                                                                        
Territory, Globalization: Struggles over Autonomy (Vancouver: University of 
British Columbia Press, 2010). 
38 Human rights may be claimed before national courts and regional human rights 
courts, as well as through particular complaint mechanisms at the UN level. I 
Watson and S Venne “Talking Up Indigenous Peoples’ Original Intent in a Space 
Dominated by State Interventions” in E Pulitano (ed.) Indigenous Rights in the 
Age of the UN Declaration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) pp 
87-109 at p 106. 
39 G Pentassuglia, “Towards a Jurisprudential Articulation of Indigenous Land 
Rights” 22 European Journal of International Law (2011) 165-202; 
40 See K Engle, “On Fragile Architecture: The UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples in the Context of Human Rights” (2011) 22 European 
Journal of International Law 141-163 at 163 (contending that “Most of the work 
that has been done on the declaration since its passage has been far from critical” 
and concluding that “If we are willing to examine it critically, the UNDRIP may 
have the potential to become an important site for the ongoing struggle over the 
meaning of human rights …”). 
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dispute settlement mechanism of the World Trade Organization41 has been 
defined as the “jewel in the crown” of this organization,42 investment 
treaty arbitration has become the most successful mechanism for settling 
investment-related disputes.43  
The creation of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body determined a 
major shift from the political consensus-based dispute settlement system 
of the GATT 194744 to a rule-based, architecture designed to strengthen 
the multilateral trade system.45 The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
(DSM) is compulsory, exclusive and highly effective.46 Panels and the 
Appellate Body interpret and apply the WTO treaties, preserving the 
rights and obligations of the WTO members. Accordingly, they cannot 
add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered 
agreements.47 Their decisions are binding on the parties, and the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU)48 provides remedies for breach of WTO 
law.  
At the procedural level, only WTO member states have locus standi in 
the DSM, i.e. individuals cannot file claims before panels and the 
Appellate Body.49 When cultural heritage-related trade disputes emerge, 
Article 23.1 of the DSU obliges Members to subject the dispute 
exclusively to WTO bodies.50 In US–Section 301 Trade Act, the Panel 
held that members “have to have recourse to the DSU DSM to the 
                                                     
41 The World Trade Organization was established in 1994. Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15th 1994. 33 ILM 1144 (1994). 
42 A Narlikar The WTO: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005). 
43 S Franck “Development and Outcomes of Investor-State Arbitration” (2009) 9 
Harvard Journal of International Law 435-489. 
44 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 30 October 1947, 55 UNTS 194. 
45 SP Crowley and JH Jackson, “WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review, 
and Deference to National Governments” (1996) 90 American Journal of 
International Law 193. 
46 P Van Den Bossche The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd edn, 2008). 
47 DSU, Article 3.2. 
48 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 
1869 UNTS 401, 33 ILM 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]. 
49 H Andersen “Protection of Non-Trade Values in WTO Appellate Body 
Jurisprudence: Exceptions, Economic Arguments, and Eluding Questions” (2015) 
18 Journal of International Economic Law 385-405, at 391. 
50 DSU, Article 23.1. 
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exclusion of any other system”.51 In Mexico–Soft Drinks the Appellate 
Body clarified that the provision even implies that “that Member is 
entitled to a ruling by a WTO panel”.52 Pursuant to WTO settled case law 
and Art. XXIII: 1 of the GATT 1994, each WTO Member which 
considers any of its benefits to be prejudiced under the covered 
agreements can bring a case before a panel. 
In parallel, as there is no single comprehensive multilateral investment 
agreement, investors’ rights are defined by a plethora of bilateral and 
regional investment treaties, customary law and general principles of law. 
International investment law provides extensive protection to investors’ 
rights in order to encourage foreign direct investment (FDI) and to foster 
economic development. At the substantive level, investment treaties 
provide for inter alia: adequate compensation for expropriated property; 
protection against discrimination; fair and equitable treatment; full 
protection and security; and assurances that the host country will honor its 
commitments regarding the investment. 
At the procedural level, investment treaties provide investors direct 
access to an international arbitral tribunal. This is a major novelty in 
international law, as customary international law does not provide such a 
mechanism. The use of the arbitration model is aimed at depoliticizing 
disputes, avoiding potential national court bias and ensuring the 
advantages of confidentiality and effectiveness.53 Arbitral tribunals review 
state acts in the light of their investment treaties, and this review has been 
compared to a sort of administrative review. Authors postulate the 
existence of a global administrative space in which the strict dichotomy 
between domestic and international has largely broken down.54 Under this 
theoretical framework, investor–state arbitration has been conceptualised 
                                                     
51 WTO Panel Report, US–Section 301 Trade Act, United States–Section 301-310 
of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R, adopted January 27th 2000, DSR 2000:II. 
para 7.43. 
52 WTO Appellate Body Report, Mexico–Taxes on Soft Drinks, Mexico–Tax 
Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WT/DS308/AB/R adopted March 
24th 2006, para 52. 
53 IFI Shihata “Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The 
Role of ICSID and MIGA” (1986) 1 ICSID Review–Foreign Investment Law 
Journal 1-25. 
54 N Krisch and B Kingsbury “Introduction: Global Governance and Global 
Administrative Law in the International Legal Order” (2006) 17 European 
Journal of International Law 1. 
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as a global administrative law (GAL) creature,55 which impels states to 
conform to GAL principles and to adopt principles of good governance.  
Given the structural imbalance between the vague and non-binding 
dispute settlement mechanisms provided by human rights treaties, and the 
highly effective and sophisticated dispute settlement mechanisms 
available under international economic law, cultural disputes involving 
investors’ or traders’ rights have often been brought before international 
economic law fora. Obviously, this does not mean that these are the only 
available fora, let alone the superior fora for this kind of dispute. Other 
fora are available such as national courts, human rights courts, regional 
economic courts and the traditional state-to-state fora such as the 
International Court of Justice or even inter-state arbitration. Some of these 
dispute settlement mechanisms may be more suitable than investor-state 
arbitration or the WTO dispute settlement mechanism to address cultural 
concerns. Given its scope, this study focuses on the jurisprudence of the 
WTO bodies and arbitral tribunals.  
One may wonder whether the fact that cultural disputes tend to be 
adjudicated before international economic law fora determines a sort of 
institutional bias. Treaty provisions can be vague and their language 
encompasses a potentially wide variety of state regulation that may 
interfere with economic interests. Therefore, a potential tension exists 
when a state adopts regulatory measures interfering with foreign 
investments or free trade, as regulation may be considered as violating 
substantive standards of treatment under investment treaties or the WTO 
covered agreements and the foreign investor may require compensation 
before arbitral tribunals or spur the home state to file a claim before the 
WTO organs.  
More specifically, with regard to the WTO DSB, “it is quite 
uncontroversial that an adjudicatory system engaged in interpreting trade-
liberalizing standards would tend to favor free trade”.56 According to 
some empirical studies, there is a consistently high rate of complainant 
success in WTO dispute resolution57 and authors have theorised that “the 
WTO panels and the WTO Appellate Body have interpreted the WTO 
agreements in a manner that consistently promotes the goal of expanding 
trade, often to the detriment of respondents’ negotiated and reserved 
                                                     
55 G Van Harten and M Loughlin “Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of 
Global Administrative Law” (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 
121-150 at 121. 
56 JP Trachtman “The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution” (1999) 40 Harvard 
International Law Journal 333. 
57 J Maton and C Maton “Independence under Fire: Extra Legal Pressures and 
Coalition Building in WTO Dispute Settlement” (2007) 10 Journal of 
International Economic Law 317.  
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regulatory competencies”.58 In particular, given the fact that about 80% of 
the cases have been settled in favor of the claimant, Colares highlighted 
that “the DSB has evolved WTO norms in a manner that consistently 
favors litigants whose interests are generally aligned with the unfettered 
expansion of trade.”59  
This study questions whether the same “institutional bias” is present in 
investor–state arbitration. Some scholars contend that such mechanism is 
biased in favor of corporate and economic interests, and “excludes 
consideration of vital non-commercial interests”.60 Certainly, given the 
architecture of the arbitral process, significant concerns arise in the 
context of disputes involving indigenous heritage. While arbitration 
structurally constitutes a private model of adjudication, investment 
disputes present public law aspects.61 Arbitral awards ultimately shape the 
relationship between the state, on the one hand, and private individuals on 
the other.62 Arbitrators determine matters such as the legality of 
governmental activity, the degree to which individuals should be protected 
from regulation, and the appropriate role of the state. 63  
Investor–state arbitration, however, distinguishes between two types 
of non-state actors: 1) foreign investors; and 2) the FDI impacted non-
state actors, including indigenous peoples.64 While indigenous peoples do 
have access to local courts, and eventually, regional human rights courts, 
the resolution of disputes arising from the investment within the territory 
of the host state is delegated to an international dispute settlement 
mechanism, thus undercutting the authority of national courts to deal with 
                                                     
58 JF Colares “A Theory of WTO Adjudication: From Empirical Analysis to 
Biased Rule Development” (2009) 42 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 
383 at 388.  
59 Ibid, at 387. 
60 R Broad, “Corporate Bias in the World Bank Group’s International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes – A Case Study of a Global Mining 
Corporation Suing El Salvador” (2015) 36 University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
International Law 854. 
61 G Van Harten “The Public-Private Distinction in the International Arbitration 
of Individual Claims against the State” (2007) 56 International & Comparative 
Law Quarterly 371-393 at 372. 
62 G Van Harten Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2007) p 70. 
63 M Sornarajah, “The Clash of Globalizations and the International Law on 
Foreign Investment” (2003) 10 Canadian Foreign Policy 1. 
64 N Gal-Or “The Investor and Civil Society as Twin Global Citizens: Proposing 
a New Interpretation in the Legitimacy Debate” (2008-2009) 32 Suffolk 
Transnational Law Review 271-301. 
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investment disputes.65 Furthermore, court decisions in the host state 
upholding complaints brought by private parties against a foreign investor 
may be challenged by the investor before an arbitral tribunal on the 
grounds that they constitute wrongful interference with the investment.66 
The increasing impact of FDI on the social sphere of the host state has 
raised the question of whether the principle of access to justice, as 
successfully developed to the benefit of investors through the provision of 
binding arbitration, ought to be matched by a corresponding right to a 
remedial process for individuals and groups adversely affected by the 
investment in the host state.67 While the recognition of multinational 
corporations (MNCs) as “international corporate citizens” has 
progressed,68 by comparison, the procedural rights of indigenous peoples 
have remained unchanged. The paradox is that the foreign company and 
indigenous peoples lie at the opposite ends of the same spectrum: the 
company is characterised by its foreignness; indigenous peoples are 
characterised by their indigeneity,69 descending from those who inhabited 
the area before colonization. At the same time, however, indigenous 
peoples have clearly defined rights under international law.70 The 
following section addresses the question as to whether indigenous 
peoples’ cultural entitlements play any role in the context of international 
disputes before international economic fora. 
 
4. When Cultures Collide 
 
As mentioned, many of the estimated 370 million indigenous peoples 
around the world have lost, or are under imminent threat of losing, their 
ancestral lands, because of the exploitation of natural resources.71 
Conflicts and disputes over the use of indigenous lands have escalated 
                                                     
65 F Francioni “Access to Justice, Denial of Justice, and International Investment 
Law” in P-M Dupuy, F Francioni and E-U Petersmann (eds) Human Rights in 
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70 Above n 5 at 797-889. 
71 Above n 4. 
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apace across the world.72 In parallel, free trade may destabilise indigenous 
communities commodifying their cultural heritage, transforming their 
lifestyle and affecting their traditional cultural practices.73 Indigenous 
peoples consider that trade liberalization and FDI “are creating the most 
adverse impacts on [their] lives” through environmental degradation, 
forced relocation and deforestation among others.74 For instance, in an 
open letter to the President of the World Bank, they state: “For the World 
Bank and the WTO, our forests are a marketable commodity. But for us, 
the forests are a home, our source of livelihood, the dwelling of our gods, 
the burial grounds of our ancestors, the inspiration of our culture”.75 The 
letter concludes with the request not to exploit their forests.  
The clash between economic interests and indigenous peoples’ 
entitlements can (and has) be(en) explored from a number of different 
angles. Due to space limits, this chapter focuses on one of the many 
aspects of the collision between indigenous rights and economic 
globalization: the clash between the protection of indigenous cultural 
heritage and the promotion of economic interests in international 
economic law.  
Indigenous cultural heritage is based on a holistic understanding of 
natural resources, cultural practices and human development. According 
to General Comment 23, “culture manifests itself in many forms, 
including a particular way of life associated with the use of land 
resources, especially in the case of indigenous peoples. [Culture] may 
include such traditional activities as fishing or hunting . . . . The 
enjoyment of those rights may require positive legal measures of 
protection and measures to ensure the effective participation of members 
of minority communities in decisions that affect them. . . . The protection 
of these rights is directed to ensure the survival and continued 
development of the cultural, religious and social identity of the minorities 
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concerned, thus enriching the fabric of society as a whole.”76 By contrast, 
an entire culture has developed around international economic law. The 
international economic culture is characterised by efficiency, productivity, 
and exploitation of natural resources in the pursuit of economic profit and 
development. Not only are conflicts between indigenous rights and 
economic interests of investors and traders frequent, but they occur on all 
continents of the world.77 Moreover, “indigenous peoples potentially 
suffer a disproportionate burden in such a conflict” due to the loss of the 
important non-economic benefit associated with their cultural identity.78 
After exploring a recent case adjudicated before an arbitral tribunal, this 
section focuses on the seals products dispute adjudicated before the WTO 
DSM. 
 
(a) Indigenous Cultural Heritage and the Promotion of Foreign 
Investments  
 
The development of natural resources is increasingly taking place in, or 
very close to, traditional indigenous areas.79 While development analysts 
point to extractive projects as anti-poverty measures, and advocate FDI as 
a major catalyst for development,80 “for the most part, the peoples in the 
areas where the resources are located tend to bear a disproportionate share 
of the negative impacts of development through reduced access to 
resources and direct exposure to pollution and environmental 
degradation”.81 In particular, rising investment in the extractive industries 
can have a devastating impact on the life and culture of the indigenous 
peoples involved.82  
The linkage between economic globalization and indigenous peoples’ 
rights has been discussed by administrative and constitutional courts at the 
national level,83 and by human rights bodies at the regional and 
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international level.84 This jurisprudence and the relevant literature are 
extensive; what is less known is the emerging jurisprudence of arbitral 
tribunals dealing with elements of indigenous cultural heritage. Given the 
impact that arbitral awards can have on indigenous peoples’ lives, scrutiny 
and critical assessment of these arbitrations is of the utmost relevance. In 
general terms, investment disputes with indigenous cultural elements are 
characterised by the need to balance the protection of indigenous cultural 
heritage and the promotion of foreign investments by the host state.  
To date, several investment disputes have involved indigenous 
cultural heritage elements.85 For reasons of space, it is not possible to 
examine all these awards in the context of this contribution; this section 
will thus examine and critically assess two investment disputes 
concerning indigenous heritage.  
In April 2015, a Costa Rican company and several Dutch investors, all 
shareholders of an ecotourism project called Cañaveral in Panama, filed a 
claim against Panama at the International Center for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes.86 The company contests decisions taken by the 
Panamanian National Land Management Agency concerning the question 
as to whether the claimants’ property is located within the protected area 
inhabited by the Gnöbe Buglé indigenous peoples in Western Panama.87 
According to the claimants, Panama’s treatment of their investment runs 
counter earlier authorizations of the same. 
Ngöbe land originally extended from the Pacific Ocean to the 
Caribbean Sea.88 Since Christopher Columbus and his crew contacted the 
tribes in 1502, Spanish conquistadores forced the Ngöbes into less 
desirable territories in the west.89 Nowadays these communities live in a 
“comarca”, i.e., a specially designated area where their collective property 
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rights are recognised by the state.90 The laws establishing these 
indigenous regions recognise the right of indigenous peoples to collective 
ownership of land within these zones and grant indigenous tribes a certain 
autonomy. These laws have been acknowledged as being “one of the 
foremost achievements in terms of the protection of indigenous rights in 
the world.”91  
Although “national laws … dealing with indigenous affairs provide a 
vital foundation on which to continue building upon and strengthening the 
rights of indigenous peoples in Panama”, the Special Rapporteur noted 
that “this foundation is fragile and unstable in many regards.”92 In 
particular, he highlighted that “Titles have yet to be awarded for the areas 
adjacent to the Ngobe-Bugle comarca in Bocas del Toro Province, which 
were designated for demarcation within a period of two years under Act 
No. 10 of 1997 … and these lands continue to be threatened, particularly 
by tourism and real estate development.”93 According to the National 
Land Management Agency “delays in according official recognition to 
collective lands and in issuing titles to them have chiefly been due to the 
claims made by landowners and settlers to the lands to be demarcated”.94  
As the case is still at a very early phase, and not even the notice of 
claim is publicly available, it is not possible to foresee whether the case 
will be settled or how the arbitral tribunal will decide it. Certainly, 
however, the investment law obligations of the state towards foreign 
investors do not justify violations of its human rights obligations towards 
indigenous peoples. In the Sawhoyamaxa case,95 the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights held Paraguay liable of violating various human rights 
of the Sawhoyamaxa indigenous community under the American 
Convention on Human Rights. These communities claimed that Paraguay 
had, inter alia, violated their right to property, by failing to recognise their 
title to ancestral lands.96 For its part, Paraguay had attempted to justify its 
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conduct contending that the lands in question belonged to German 
investors and were protected under the Germany-Paraguay bilateral 
investment treaty (BIT).97 According to the government, the BIT 
prohibited the expropriation of foreign investors’ lands.  
However, after noting the linkage between land rights and the culture 
of indigenous peoples98 the Court clarified that the investment law 
obligations of the state did not exempt the state from protecting and 
respecting the property rights of the Sawhoyamaxa.99 Rather, the Court 
noted that compliance with investment treaties should always be 
compatible with the human rights obligations of the state.100 Moreover, 
the Court pointed out that the relevant BIT did not prohibit expropriation; 
rather it subjected it to several requirements, including the existence of a 
public purpose and the payment of compensation.101 Therefore, the Court 
found a violation of Article 21 of the Convention102 and ordered the 
government to return the “traditional lands” to the Sawhoyamaxa 
community. In 2014, Paraguay passed an expropriation law expropriating 
certain foreign-owned lands.103 Two ranching companies, Kansol S.A. and 
Roswell Company S.A. challenged the expropriation before the 
Paraguayan Supreme Court on the grounds of “unconstitutionality”.104 
However, the claim was rejected.105  
 
(b) Indigenous Culture and the Protection of Free Trade: The EU 
Seals Disputes 
 
For the Inuit, a group of culturally similar indigenous peoples inhabiting 
the Arctic regions of Greenland, Canada, and Alaska, not only is seal 
hunting an integral part of their culture and identity, but it also contributes 
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to their livelihood.106 In Canada, indigenous peoples’ income from sealing 
“represents between twenty-five and thirty-five percent of their total 
annual income”.107 The hunt is part of their culture and supports 
subsistence.  
However, as Europeans perceive the seals hunt as cruel and inhuman, 
because of the means through which the seals are hunted, the EU adopted 
a comprehensive regime governing seal products.108 The E.U. seal regime 
prohibits the importation and sale in the E.U. of any seal product except: 
(a) those derived from hunts traditionally conducted by Inuit and other 
indigenous communities, which contribute to their subsistence;109 and (b) 
those that are by-products of a hunt regulated by national law and with the 
sole purpose of sustainable management of marine resources.110 In 
addition, seal products for personal use may be imported but may not be 
placed on the market.111 The E.U. allowed the exception for indigenous 
hunt because of the international law commitments of its member states 
and of the UNDRIP.112 
Nonetheless, Inuit groups contested the ban. Although the regulation 
allows seal products to be placed on the market where they result from 
hunts traditionally conducted by Inuit and other indigenous communities 
in recognition of the fact that sealing is an important part of the Inuit 
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lifestyle, according to indigenous peoples’ representatives, the “Inuit 
exemption” will not prevent the market for seal products from collapsing. 
Since the Inuit people do not export seal products themselves, but export 
them via non-indigenous exporters, they allege that the derogation in their 
favor would remain an “empty box.” Furthermore, they stress that the 
regulation was adopted without the participation of the Inuit.113 Therefore, 
they perceived the aboriginal exemption as inadequate to sustain cultural 
practices and praised the Canadian government for bringing the seal ban 
to the WTO.114 
Canada and Norway brought claims against the E.U. before the WTO 
DSB, contending that the E.U. seal regime was inconsistent with the 
European Union’s obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994)115 and under the Technical Barriers to 
Trade (TBT) Agreement.116 Canada and Norway argued, inter alia, that 
the indigenous communities condition (IC condition) and the marine 
resource management condition (MRM condition) violated the non-
discrimination obligation under Article I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994.117 
According to Canada and Norway, such conditions accord seal products 
from Canada and Norway treatment less favourable than that accorded to 
like seal products of domestic origin, mainly from Sweden and Finland as 
well as those of other foreign origin, in particular from Greenland.118 In 
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fact, the majority of seals hunted in Canada and Norway would not 
qualify under the exceptions, “while most, if not all, of Greenlandic seal 
products are expected to conform to the requirements under the IC 
exception”.119 Therefore, according to the complainants, the regime would 
de facto discriminate against Canadian and Norwegian imports of seal 
products,120 as it would restrict virtually all trade in seal products from 
Canada and Norway within the E.U.121 Moreover, the complainants 
argued that while the E.U. measures did not prevent products derived 
from seals killed inhumanely from being sold on the E.U. market,122 they 
could prevent products derived from seals killed humanely by commercial 
hunters from being placed on the market.123  
Canada pointed out that seal harvesting provided thousands of jobs in 
Canada’s remote coastal and northern communities where few economic 
opportunities existed and had been an important part of the Inuit way of 
life for centuries. Moreover, Canada maintained that the E.U.’s exemption 
for trade in traditional Inuit seal products would prove to be ineffective, 
particularly in the face of the collapse of the larger market, and the Inuit 
would suffer the effects. The trade ban would restrict virtually all trade in 
seal products within the European Union. According to Canada, the 
solution to this would be the restoration of full market access.  
In parallel, Norway pointed out that none of the species hunted were 
endangered, and none were listed by the Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).124 It 
added that such a ban infringed on WTO members’ right to trade in 
marine resources harvested in a sustainable manner.125 Norway also 
claimed that since only certain countries have indigenous peoples, 
arguably the measure will have a disparate impact and therefore it does 
not treat all of the WTO member states equally.126  
The key question of the dispute was whether the seal products 
produced by indigenous peoples and those produced by non-indigenous 
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peoples were like products.127 If so, as the two products were treated 
differently by the E.U. ban, there would be discrimination, which was 
prohibited under GATT Article III. In the assessment of likeness a key 
question was whether consumer preferences would matter in light of the 
EC–asbestos case:128 “the seal products made by indigenous communities 
for subsistence purposes could well serve different consumer needs than 
those produced through larger operations and by non-indigenous peoples 
for commercial purposes”.129 Finally, if the panel found that there was 
discrimination, it should examine the question as to whether the seal 
products regulation was justified under any of the exceptions under 
Article XX of the GATT 1994, and in particular under Article XX(a) on 
public morals.  
The panel found that the seal products produced by indigenous 
peoples and those not hunted by indigenous peoples were like products.130 
The panel acknowledged the existence of a number of international law 
instruments, including the UNDRIP, focusing on the protection of cultural 
heritage.131 The panel also referred to a number of WTO countries 
adopting analogous Inuit exceptions.132 These sources were taken into 
account as “factual evidence”.133 Despite the reference to these 
instruments, however, the panel concluded that the design and application 
of the IC measure was not even-handed because the IC exception was 
available de facto to Greenland.134 Therefore, the panel held, inter alia, 
that the exception provided for indigenous communities under the E.U. 
Seal Regime accorded more favourable treatment to seal products 
produced by indigenous communities than that accorded to like domestic 
and foreign products.135 The panel concluded that the same exception, 
inter alia, violated Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994 because an 
advantage granted by the E.U. to seal products derived from hunts 
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traditionally conducted by the Inuit was not accorded immediately and 
unconditionally to like products originating in Canada.136  
Finally, the panel examined the question as to whether the seal 
products regulation was justified under any of the exceptions under 
Article XX of the GATT 1994, and in particular under Article XX(a) on 
public morals. The panel noted that “animal welfare is an issue of ethical 
or moral nature in the European Union”.137 Therefore the panel found that 
the E.U. seal regime was necessary to protect public morals. Yet, it 
determined that the regime had a discriminatory impact that could not be 
justified under the chapeau of Article Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994.138  
Immediately after the release of the reports, Canada, Norway and the 
E.U. each appealed certain legal interpretations developed in the panel 
reports. The Appellate Body inter alia confirmed that the E.U. seal regime 
de facto discriminated like products under Articles I:1 (Most Favored 
Nation) and III:4 (National Treatment) of the GATT 1994. The AB also 
confirmed that the ban on seal products can be justified on moral grounds 
under GATT Article XX(a). However, it held that the regime did not meet 
the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994, 
criticising the way the exception for Inuit hunts has been designed and 
implemented.139 The AB noted inter alia that the IC exception contained 
no anti-circumvention clause,140 and pinpointed that “seal products 
derived from … commercial hunts could potentially enter the E.U. market 
under the IC exception”.141 The AB concluded that the E.U. Seal Regime 
was not justified under Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994.142 
Therefore, the E.U. will have to refine the seal regime to demonstrate 
good faith, insert anti-circumvention rules and thus comply with the 
chapeau requirements. Ultimately, the flaws found by the panel and AB 
were not with the ban itself, but with the specific implementation of the 
ban’s exception for indigenous peoples.  
 
5. Critical Assessment 
 
The contribution of the UNDRIP to current discourse on indigenous 
heritage and rights in international law is significant. Why should one 
focus on indigenous heritage while other pressing needs and indigenous 
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rights are at stake? There is one fundamental reason: because culture is so 
close to human dignity that without protection of indigenous cultural 
identity all of the other claims of indigenous peoples lose strength. Other 
claims are not replaced by cultural claims, but complemented and 
reinforced. The UNDRIP acknowledges and adopts this holistic 
understanding of indigenous peoples’ rights. In fact, the protection of the 
cultural identity of indigenous peoples is its raison d’être143 and “one can 
find the cultural rights angle in each article of the Declaration”.144 
 The significant achievements of the UNDRIP should not lead to the 
conclusion that further steps should not be taken. The UNDRIP 
constitutes the summa of decades of elaboration, and a milestone; at the 
same time it should also constitute the point of departure for further 
analysis and action. The analysed case studies highlight several different 
clashes: the clash between international economic law and domestic 
regulatory autonomy;145 the clash between animal welfare and traditional 
cultural practices; and the clash between an international economic culture 
and a local indigenous culture. Of particular concern is the clash of 
cultures between the protection of indigenous heritage and the promotion 
of economic activities. Economic globalization can affect indigenous 
peoples’ way of life. The collision between the protection of indigenous 
heritage and the promotion of economic interests in international 
economic law makes the case for strengthening the current regime 
protecting indigenous heritage. Participation of indigenous peoples in the 
decisions which can affect their rights is crucial.146 
International economic fora may not be the most appropriate fora for 
disputes adjudicating cultural heritage-related issues. At the procedural 
level, arbitral tribunals constitute an uneven playing field: while foreign 
investors have locus standi – i.e., the right to act or be heard – before 
these tribunals, indigenous peoples do not have direct access to these 
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dispute settlement mechanisms. Rather, their arguments need to be 
espoused by their home government. Nonetheless, “for a variety of 
reasons, states cannot be reasonably expected to adequately represent the 
… rights of indigenous peoples.”147 In fact, the land claims and cultural 
entitlements of indigenous peoples often compete with the economic 
development plans of both investors and states. Therefore, despite the 
formal premise of equality between the parties, there are structural power 
asymmetries between companies and indigenous communities that 
governments rarely mitigate. Not only does investor–state arbitration fail 
to take into account the eventual conflict of interest between the 
entitlements of indigenous peoples and the economic development plans 
of the state, but – like the WTO dispute settlement mechanism – it also 
confers distinct procedural advantages to foreign investors vis-à-vis other 
private actors.  
While indigenous peoples can (and have) present(ed) friend of the 
court (amicus curiae) briefs reflecting their interests, investment tribunals 
and the WTO panels and Appellate Body are not legally obligated to 
consider such briefs – rather, they have the faculty to do so should they 
deem it appropriate.148 The requests were granted if the friends of the 
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court could demonstrate that they could assist tribunals without unduly 
delaying arbitrations.149 As amici curiae, indigenous peoples cannot ask 
for final or interlocutory remedies to preserve their cultural entitlements 
and land rights before arbitral tribunals and the WTO DSM.  
While foreign investors are emancipated from the need to invoke 
diplomatic protection from their home state, for indigenous peoples 
international law remain state-centered, as they remain subject to the 
procedural requirement that their claims be espoused by the state. While 
foreign investors are not required to exhaust the local remedies before 
recurring to investment treaty arbitration, indigenous peoples must 
exhaust the same before being able to pursue their own claims before an 
international tribunal.  
Finally, there is gross discrepancy in the efficacy of the procedural 
mechanisms that enforce international economic law and human rights 
law respectively. Investors’ and traders’ claims “are adjudicated faster, 
sooner, and with greater potential for immediate state liability than the 
human rights claims of indigenous peoples, which must find their way 
through domestic courts”.150 For instance, the WTO DSM is subject to a 
rigourous timeframe. Furthermore, “any strictly pecuniary quantification 
of damages is likely to favor foreign investors” and traders at the expense 
of the competing interests of indigenous peoples.151 In fact, “permanent 
alterations to landscape” or alteration of traditional cultural practices 
incompatible with minimal subsistence requirements constitute irreparable 
harms to indigenous peoples but “may not be accorded significant weight 
by exclusively pecuniary measurements”.152 Moreover, the perceived 
tendency of the international economic regime to externalize the costs of 
carrying out economic activity by placing them fully on states and the fear 
of costly litigation can chill the willingness of states to adopt measures 
protecting indigenous entitlements (regulatory chill).153  
Substantively, a clash of culture has emerged between competing sets 
of international norms governing indigenous rights and transnational 
economic activities respectively. Given the cultural connection of 
indigenous peoples to their lands, a number of international law 
instruments, including the UNDRIP, have recognised specific forms of 
use and enjoyment of property, based on the culture of indigenous 
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communities. The maintenance of traditional lifestyle is necessary for the 
physical and cultural survival of indigenous peoples.  
International economic fora are not the best fora, let alone the unique 
fora, in which to adjudicate this collision of norms. They may not have a 
specific expertise on indigenous peoples’ rights. Nor do they have the 
mandate to interpret and apply human rights treaties. They are tribunals of 
limited jurisdiction and cannot adjudicate on eventual infringements of 
indigenous peoples’ rights. They lack the jurisdiction to hold states liable 
for breach of their human rights obligations. Rather, they can only 
determine if the protections in the relevant investment treaty or WTO 
covered agreement respectively have been breached. 
However, this does not mean that these fora cannot take into account 
other international law obligations of the host state. The collision between 
international economic law and other fields of international law can be 
solved through international economic law itself albeit to a limited extent. 
Two avenues can facilitate the consideration of indigenous entitlements in 
international economic disputes.154 First, as international investment 
treaties are periodically renegotiated, treaty drafters can expressly 
accommodate indigenous peoples’ entitlements in the text of these treaties 
(i.e., a “treaty-driven approach”).155 For instance, Canada and New 
Zealand have inserted specific clauses protecting indigenous rights in their 
trade and investment agreements.156 This explicit recognition of 
indigenous entitlements by international investment treaties can allow the 
state to protect indigenous groups without the fear of expensive 
investment claims. In parallel, investors can take into account the 
existence of protected groups when assessing the economic risks of the 
given investment.157 Second, international economic courts can take into 
account indigenous entitlements within the current framework of 
international economic law (i.e., a “judicially driven approach”).158  
 International economic law is not a self-contained regime.159 As a 
matter of treaty interpretation, Article 3.2 of the DSU enables panels and 
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the AB to interpret WTO treaties in accordance with customary rules of 
treaty interpretation as reflected in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).160 Analogous provisions 
appear in the text of several investment treaties. Notoriously, Article 
31(3)(c) of the VCLT requires that “[t]here shall be taken into account, 
together with the context: … any relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties”. Pursuant to Article 
31(3)(c), ‘[e]very treaty provision must be read not only in its own 
context, but in the wider context of general international law, whether 
conventional or customary’.161 This provision expresses the principle of 
systemic integration within the international legal system, indicating that 
treaty regimes are themselves creatures of international law.162 Therefore, 
both WTO adjudicative bodies and arbitral tribunals have some 
interpretative space to consider other international treaties when they 
collide with international economic law. In fact, customary rules of treaty 
interpretation require that international law protecting indigenous peoples’ 
rights serve as interpretive context if they are relevant to the interpretation 
of the respective international economic law provisions.  
However, only rarely have WTO adjudicative bodies looked outside 
the WTO framework. For instance, in the seal products dispute, reference 
to international law instruments was made, but such instruments played a 
limited role, if any, in the final decision. Arbitral tribunals appear to be 
more open to referring to other international law instruments, looking to 
human rights law for analogies, or as an aid in constructing the meaning 
of investment treaty provisions, albeit the weight of such references in the 
final decision remain unquantifiable.  
Another way through which non-economic concerns can be inserted 
into the fabric of international economic law is offered by the relevant 
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exceptions. Article XX of the GATT 1994 includes a (closed) list of 
(limited) exceptions to fundamental trade standards. In some 
circumstances, the AB has sought guidance from other sources of law and 
international organizations to interpret and apply this provision. For 
instance, in the Shrimp–Turtle case, the AB referred to multilateral 
environmental agreements to define the scope of “exhaustible natural 
resources”.163 Analogously, the general exceptions listed in Article XX 
can be interpreted in light of international human rights instruments such 
as the UNDRIP. In parallel, while a few investment treaties include 
general exceptions, they include language relating to the environment 
which could be interpreted extensively and evolutively so as to include 
indigenous entitlements.164 
Yet, only a few investment treaties include such a “general 
exceptions” clause. Most international investment agreements were 
concluded some decades ago, “when economic development was a 
primary concern over issues of environmental sustainability or cultural 
rights.”165 Moreover, the restrictive requirements of the introductory part 
(chapeau) of Article XX have de facto limited the successful application 
of Article XX of GATT 1994. Notoriously, the chapeau of Article XX 
requires that the measures restricting trade must not be applied in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, and 
they must not constitute a disguised restriction on international trade.  
Finally, if certain indigenous rights have acquired the status of jus 
cogens norms,166 those norms should prevail in case of conflict with 
international economic law.167 International public order requires 
international economic courts to consider whether the proceedings do not 
violate competing international law obligations of a peremptory character. 
Yet, the present role of jus cogens norms in the context of investment 
arbitration remains unsettled at best and peripheral at worst. Rarely have 
the parties contended that a norm of jus cogens has been violated, and 
even when they have done so, arbitral tribunals have declined to 
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adjudicate on the matter, stating that they have a limited mandate and 
cannot adjudicate on human rights claims.168 Moreover, in some 
arbitrations, the host states have preferred to make reference only to 
domestic constitutional provisions rather than relying on the alleged jus 
cogens nature of the rights involved. This is not surprising, as such 
pleadings may be considered to contribute to state practice, and states are 
very careful in invoking jus cogens as the same arguments could be used 
against them in other contexts, i.e., before national constitutional courts, 
regional human rights courts and international monitoring bodies. For 
instance, with regard to indigenous peoples’ rights, including the right to 
be consulted in matters affecting them or their religious rights, states have 
referred to domestic constitutional provisions.169 The state’s invocation of 
human rights to justify a given regulatory measure can serve as 
evidentiary record against the state itself in other proceedings, as it can be 




The effective protection of indigenous cultural heritage benefits all 
humanity. Today, a growing number of international law instruments 
highlight cultural diversity as the common heritage of mankind,170 and the 
UNDRIP has furthered the “culturalization of indigenous rights”,171 
enunciating a number of cultural entitlements of indigenous peoples, and 
highlighting the linkage between the preservation of their cultural identity 
and the enjoyment of their human rights. Although the Declaration per se 
is not binding, it may be(come) so, insofar as it reflects customary 
international law. At the very least, the UNDRIP constitutes a standard 
that states should strive to achieve.  
The interplay between the promotion of free trade and foreign direct 
investment on the one hand, and indigenous cultural heritage on the other 
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in international economic law is an almost unexplored field.172 This study 
has shed some light on this complex connection. The analysed case 
studies provide a snapshot of the clash of cultures between international 
economic governance and indigenous heritage. They also highlight a 
fundamental clash between local and global dimensions of governance. 
Indigenous heritage is local; it belongs to specific places; economic 
governance has an international character. At the same time, indigenous 
heritage also belongs to the international discourse, while both foreign 
investments and international trade can have an impact on local polities, 
affecting local lifestyle and cultural entitlements.  
Economic disputes concerning indigenous cultural heritage have been 
brought before international economic fora. Such disputes often involve 
the conflict between the protection of indigenous cultural heritage and the 
promotion of economic freedoms. These disputes can provide an 
important testing-ground for the degree to which international economic 
law protections owed by states to foreign investors and traders will be 
read by adjudicators in light of a state’s parallel international law 
obligations to its own indigenous peoples.  
International economic fora may not be the most suitable fora to settle 
this kind of dispute, in that they may face difficulties in finding an 
appropriate balance between the different interests concerned. They are 
courts of limited jurisdiction, and cannot adjudicate on state violations of 
indigenous peoples’ entitlements. This does not mean, however, that they 
should (or do) not take cultural considerations into account. This chapter 
has explored various ways for integrating cultural threads into the fabric 
of international (economic) law. Indigenous cultural entitlements can be 
incorporated into the reasoning of international economic courts. Not only 
can these approaches promote the effectiveness of human rights 
instruments but they can also humanise and re-legitimise international 
economic law, fostering a sense of unity and complementarity between 
different competing subsets of international law.  
In conclusion, FDI and free trade can represent a potentially positive 
force for development. Still, state policy and practice concerning 
economic activities must be mindful of its implications for the culture of 
indigenous peoples. Given the fact that international economic law 
adjudication can dramatically affect indigenous communities, 
international economic courts ought to hear the voices of these 
communities. Indigenous communities should not disappear in the 
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jurisprudence of these dispute settlement mechanisms.173 Given the 
possible conflicts of interest among state components and the specificities 
of indigenous peoples’ culture, society and history, indigenous peoples 
should not be characterised as mere components of the state or as private 
actors and/or market participants. This chapter highlighted two different 
yet complementary avenues for integrating indigenous peoples’ concerns 
into the fabric of international economic law. On the one hand, since 
international investment treaties are renegotiated periodically, there is 
scope for inserting ad hoc clauses within these treaties to protect 
indigenous entitlements. On the other hand, de lege lata, international 
economic law is not a self-contained regime, but should be interpreted and 
applied in the light of international law. This is required by customary 
rules of treaty interpretation as restated by the VCLT. In this manner, the 
UNDRIP becomes relevant. Yet, as Reisman put it almost twenty years 
ago, discussing the draft of the UNDRIP, “It remains to be seen whether 
the words in this noble instrument will be transformed into effective 
practice or will simply … collec[t] the alligator tears that have been shed 
for centuries for the victims of cultural imperialisms.”174 
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